Tunisia: the fate of moderate political Islam on the razor

The heinous assassination of Chokri Belaid could end the prospects of a moderate political Islam in Tunisia. The latter’s main advocate, Ennahda, is walking a razor-thin line between prevalence and self-confinement.

Throughout 2012, secular forces in Tunisia- headed by leaders like Chokri Belaid – vigorously denounced Ennahda for facilitating political violence and preparing an Islamic power grab by:
a- Politically appointing its militants to key administrative posts (in areas like justice, interior, or the press)
b- Providing political cover to organizations like the “Ligue de Protection de la Revolution”, whose members –predominantly Ennahda sympathizers — have been violently sabotaging rallies by the opposition
c- Implicitly tolerating the violent reactions by Salafis to some Tunisian cultural events, and their attacks on historic monuments that they consider incompatible with Islam (mausolea and shrines)

Conversely, Ennahda accuses the opposition of conspiring with the remains of Ben Ali’s regime to falsely defame it, and stopping at nothing to prevent moderate political Islam from succeeding at government.
The assassination of Chokri Belaid brought this polarization to its climax.

And in response, two divergent reactions by Ennahda’s most prominent leaders saw the day:
Mr. Jebali — Tunisia’s prime minister and Ennahda’s number two – showed leadership and wisdom by proposing, without consulting his own party, a cabinet reshuffle and the formation of a caretaker neutral technocratic government that would organize elections as soon as possible.
Mr. Ghannoushi, Ennahda’s most representative figure, refused the prime minister’s proposal, fearing that it suggests an acceptance of responsibility for the assassination, and insisted on keeping the rains of power against what he considers a conspiracy against Ennahda.

The final choice between these two paths will greatly define the subsequent course of the Tunisian revolution. But it will also define the chances of political Islam of ever becoming an acceptable alternative for the rest of Tunisian society, and indeed the rest of the world:
If Ennahda ends up choosing the path of confrontation with the rest of the Tunisian political forces, its credibility — and with it the credibility of political Islam — will be significantly and irreversibly eroded outside its core constituency. Further, as the polarization escalates and both sides radicalize, the unwavering 30% of Islamic support in Tunisia could find itself trapped in a downward spiral into sever conservatism. No secular, or liberal, or even moderate Muslim leader should take such prospects lightly.

The battle in Tunisia for, or against, political Islam is far from being won or lost. But the prospects of a moderate political Islam could end if Ennahda chooses a defensive approach.
Mr. Ghannouchi should embrace compromise, and follow the example of his prime minister, because the razor-thin line Ennahda is treading not only threatens to slash its prospects of electoral victory, but also to shred its chances of ever leading the way towards a moderate and modern political Islam in the Arab world.

Jade Salhab is a private sector development consultant for the World Bank and Harvard’s Belfer Centre for International Affairs. He is based in Tunisia since September 2012.