Venezuela's petro revolution

Hugo Chávez has been in power for ten years now in Venezuela. The president’s impulsive and obstinate actions make it difficult to conduct an independent analysis of his policy. For some, Chávez is a messiah, a new leader. For others, he’s a second Mussolini or an old style people’s agitator. Alma De Walsche visited Venezuela after one decade of Bolivarian revolution and assessed the impact of those ten years.
‘The people were tired of the old school politics with its corrupt leaders.’ It’s one of the few things that Chávez’ supporters and opponents agree upon. The traditional political parties were compromised and left millions of poor people frustrated. In this climate, on February 4th of 1992 Hugo Chávez Frias forced his breakthrough in politics with a coup d’état. The coup failed, but in 1998, Chávez returned.
With his Movement for the Fifth Republic, the “Movimiento Va Republica”, he signed up as a candidate for the presidential elections, which he won convincingly. Chávez entered as the homeland rescuer, someone who had listened to the cry of the people. He lived up to the nation’s deep desire for change, which first arose during a different rebellion, the one of February 27th of 1989 in Caracazo. At that time, the people demonstrated massively to show their aversion to President Carlos Andrés Perez’ neoliberal policy, armed in the streets with pots and pans. Chávez broke with this neoliberal policy and started a Bolivarian revolution, named after his great idol: freedom fighter Simon Bolivar.

bolivar lives!


Chávez marked the beginning of a new era, the Fifth Republic. A new, progressive constitution was developed, among other changes renaming the country from Republica de Venezuela into Republica Bolivariana de Venezuela. The presidents’ reigning term was prolonged from five to six years and the power was divided between five authorities instead of three: besides the legislative, the executive and judicial power, a civilian power and an electoral power were installed.
The civilian power incorporates the moral authority, with its anti-corruption units. The electoral power is responsible for organizing everything related to the elections and referenda. ‘Here in Venezuela, we don’t have a representative democracy like you have in Europe’, a Venezuelan says. ‘We have a participative democracy. The people can give its opinion on everything.’ Chávez calls it Poder Popular, the people’s power, and an ‘intensification of democracy’. Over the past decade, people already went about ten times off to vote for elections and referenda. Only once, the result was negative for the officialism, the president’s movement. That was during the 2 December referendum in 2007.

Chávez’ success is directly linked to his style. Better than any other political leader, he speaks the language of his people. He feels them and gestures like them. He manages to touch the people’s hearts. ‘Chávez is very much like us: emotional, impulsive, spontaneous. And indeed he does make a mistake now and then, but he’s never too proud to apologize. I ‘d never thought a president would do that’, people say. Or else: ‘Chávez breaks with all diplomatic gallantry and disregards all protocol. But so what? Often he’s merely saying out loud what all of us are thinking in silence.’ Many Venezuelans think of their president in the same way.

From the beginning, Chávez made the lower classes to the flagship of his policy. Before, they were left out of sight. In order to address their most urgent needs, the president organized numerous misiones, social programs spread all over the country. For health care, there is Barrio Adentro, supported by Cuban doctors. Misión Rivas, Robinson and Sucre offer adults a kind of second chance education on primary, secondary and higher education level. Thousands of social houses have been built, even if the housing program is seriously running behind on schedule, on the existing needs and on the accomplishments of the previous governments.
Then there is the Misión Alimentación, organized through the Mercados de Alimentos (alimentary shops), where people can buy basic products at half or even one third of the regular market price. Even more crucial than these misiones, according to some, are the consejos comunales or district councils for self-governance. As a practical exercise in local politics, they receive direct funds from the president to finance projects in their city quarters, such as the organization of community houses and infrastructural improvements.

Some objective data from the National Statistics Institute indicate that Venezuela is doing not so bad. Ten years ago, 29.3% of the population was poor. Nowadays, the percentage dropped to 23.4%. The UN Index for Human Development (combining indicators for life expectancy, education and buying power) increased to 0,8263. With this rate, Venezuela belongs to the highly developed countries. The inequality between poor and ridge decreased between 1998 and 2007 by 13.7%. The minimum wage equals 312 dollar a month and is the highest of all Latin American countries. In January 2008, the unemployment rate was 7.6 percent, even if over 40 percent of the active population is involved in informal labour.

Also in the region, Chávez’ presence didn’t go by unnoticed. He launched the ALBA –Alternativa Bolivariana de America– as an alternative for the neoliberal free trade treaty for the Americas (ALCA), which actually never went into force.  Alba is also the Spanish word for dawn. The ALBA is a socially orientated cooperation network between Venezuela and befriended countries Cuba, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Honduras.

Trade agreements have been concluded with Brazil, Argentina and in the Caribbean region, like in Petrocaribe and Petrosur, and Chávez stimulated the creation of Unasur and of the Banco del Sur. 

“either you are with me, or against me”


Even though Chávez presented his project from the beginning as a “Bolivarian Revolution”, different phases can be distinguished. In the first years he vaguely referred to a “third way”, as promoted by Tony Blair, a correction to the neoliberal ideology awarding a more important role for the state. In that period, there was no trace of any verbal punching towards the US. The major milestone in the first ten years was the coup d’état on April 11th 2002, when the opposition committed a coup in a most clumsy way. Two days later, Chávez’ followers brought their president back into power. Chavez retook his presidential seat in Miraflores and installed himself more steady than ever.
Only at the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, in January 2005, Chávez first exposed his “socialism of the 21st century” project. According to Miguel Angel Contreras, a sociologist working at the Central University of Caracas, in this period the Bolivarian project began to be worked out in more detail.  

At the end of 2006, a large majority reelected Chávez for a second term. However, in the months following his reelection he took that drastic and continuous measures to enforce his project, that the people overruled him on December 2nd 2007 in a referendum. In that referendum, Chávez had proposed a modification of 69 articles of the constitution, aimed to ‘rooting the socialist revolution more firmly’.
These modifications in particular referred to an extension of the president’s power, a change of the definition of possession and a ‘different geography of the power’. The result was three million Chavez-supporters staying home, in order not having to vote against his proposal. Chávez himself called 2008 a year of correction and revision, necessary to guaranty the victory in the local elections of November last year. Once this victory was ensured, the February’s referendum needed to force yet another breakthrough.

Since 2006, politics in Venezuela circle more and more around Chavez. The opposition talks about an “autocratic leadership”. Also Miguel Angel Contreras, although fully in favour of the reform process, is very critical about the leader.  ‘Soliptic behavior’, he calls it: Chávez emphasizes his own personality and tolerates opponents around him with increasing difficulty. After his reelection in 2006 Chávez requested 18 special mandates from the parliament to make some of his decisions pass trough, clearly revealing where Chávez is heading.

Not only he decided to nationalize the oil company PVDSA, but also other strategic sectors, such as the steel industry, telecommunication, the Caracas electricity, the cement industry and the Cumanacoa sugar company. He replaced the Movement of the Fifth Republic autonomously by the Unified Socialist Party of Venezuela the ‘PSUV’ (Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela). In his opinion, the coalition partners had to renounce to their names and join him to form the PSUV. The existing Communist Party (PCV), Podemos and Patria Para Todos (PPT) refused, which was interpreted by Chávez as “contrarevolutionary”. Those who are not in favour of me are against me, is the leader’s device. Podemos and the PPT left the coalition.
Also the referendum of 2 December 2007 was a decision on Chávez’ own account. According to Miguel Angel Contreras, Chávez made a mistake considering the 2006 elections victory as a white card of the people. As the referendum showed, the people don’t follow their leader unconditionally. ‘The Venezuelans don’t want a project which only depends on Chávez. More and more, the people realize that politics is something they want to be involved in’.
This is at least something which the Venezuelans acquired over the last decades and are not willing to let go off again. ‘Chávez is physically and mentally shaped in the ranks of the army following a hierarchic structure, not a structure of power division”, as some try to explain. His Bolivarian Revolution is called a “civil-military” project. The army’ name, Fuerzas Armadas Nacionales, was changed into Fuerzas Armadas Bolivarianas during Chavez’ reign – a measure that was controversial even among his allies, as an army is linked in principle to a country, not a president.

The military presence in the Venezuelan society didn’t stay limited to some civil tasks for soldiers in the social projects. Lately, the revolution was provided with an armed right hand. One of the stipulations in the 2 December referendum was the creation of people’s militias as a fifth segment of the army, besides the land forces, the air forces, the marines and the National Guards.  The people disapproved, but in the mean time the militias are there. Chávez considers the option that one day, the revolution might have to be defended by force.

The media’s power


In the political arena, media have become a full competitor. Eleazar Díaz, director of Ultimas Noticias, the largest and most objective national newspaper says: ‘In all of the elections and referenda of the last ten years, we can see a 60-40 percent division of votes. This 40 percent is not only accountable to the elite and to the rich middle class, who represent not more than 13.5 percent of the population. If the opposition’s political project is hardly worth mentioning (no program, no candidates), then why doesn’t Chávez succeed in reducing the other side’s share of voters?’
According to Díaz, this is caused by the power of the media. ‘In Venezuela there are 90 newspapers, out of which eighty are controlled by the opposition. Out of the 600 radio stations, 500 are in the hands of the opposition.’ Concerning the TV stations, the division is more balanced. On the opposition’s side, the main station is Globovisión, while the officialism is in control of VTV-Canal 8, Vive-TV, Telesur and other stations.
On Canal 8, the president’s political retorics can be admired for hours during the program Alo Presidente. In Venezuela, the influence of television on the people’s culture and mentality can hardly be overestimated. Joel Capriles realizes this. He is one of the popular leaders in Barrio 23 de Enero, a legendary area in Caracas populated by approximately half a million people. The people who initiated the events in Caracazo in February 1989 and who brought Chavez back through the coup originated from this area. This is the territory of Chávez’ storm troops. Capriles believes in the process. In his opinion, Chávez did reach a few breakthroughs. He considers the new constitution and the fact that nowadays everybody is involved in politics as very important realizations. However, he doesn’t estimate the revolution accomplished just yet. ‘We’re very consumption-oriented and watch TV for hours. It affects the mentality and the culture of the people.’
Ruben Martínez agrees upon this. Martínez, coordinator of Barrio Adentro in his city-district in Caracas, is a hard line Chávez militant a so called rojo-rojito, deep red. Martínez: ‘We are ten adults living at home. And we’ve got five TV-sets. My sisters all vote for Chávez, but I’m the only one watching Canal 8. The others prefer soap operas and commercials.’ Martinez summarizes the dilemma as follows: ‘In the minds of the people, one can find more of the American way of life ideal than of the socialist revolutionary alternative. Political education and awareness is lacking. We’re confronted to the difficult task of making a revolution in a country with a lot of money.’ This money comes from the petroleum industry. This was the case already before Chávez entered, but he enforced the petroleum industry.

petro-socialism


Petroleum money is the living source of the Bolivarian Revolution. It sustains the social programs and the foreign policy is built on it. Some disapprove of the cheap oil deliveries, because of the millions of dollars Venezuela misses that way. In the country too, oil is ridiculously cheap in Venezuela: around two to three eurocent per liter. A 25 centiliter bottle of water costs twenty times more than one liter of gasoline. Raising these prices would mean committing political suicide.
Despite the low petrol prices allies can enjoy, more money has streamed into Venzuela in the past decade than ever before. When Chávez came into power, one barrel of rough oil cost 10 dollar. Mid 2008 that price went up to 116 and even 147 dollar. Although the price dropped again in December to 31 dollar per barrel, the average 2008 price remained 87.2 dollar. For 2009, an average price of 60 dollar per barrel is expected.
According to Saul Ortega, vice-president of the parliament, there will be no problem to continue supporting the social programs. Venezuela has built up a reserve of about 43 billion dollar, which could be increased to 70 billion through some existing funds and investments.

Besides, Ortega assumes that the oil price will rise again. ‘The global oil reserves are running out, while alternative energy sources remain expensive. Venezuela has proven oil reserves. I am convinced that we will get a lot of money in return for it.’ Because of the oil profits, Venezuela chose to import food and half-developed products on a large scale. Seventy percent of what is consumed in Venezuela has to be imported, for food the percentage is even eighty. The food prices increased by 50 percent in 2008 alone. The productive sector was reduced to half its size and the nationalizing trend discourages foreign companies to invest in Venezuela. The strong dependence on oil has marked Venezuela since the oil exploitation first started in 1936, and Chávez further confirmed this pattern.

The overall economic balance of 2008 resulted in an inflation rate of 30.9 percent, the highest in the region. The increase of the minimum wages can’t catch up with such an inflation level. Economic growth dropped from 8 percent in 2007 to 4.9 in 2008. Especially the major dependency on imported agricultural products is being strongly criticized lately. Both in his State of the Union last January and in his weekly Alo Presidente programs Chávez expands in great detail on his plans to develop the agricultural sector and to invest in the development of the agrochemical industry, a derivate of petrol.
the everlasting revolution

Is this really a revolution? The opposition, both left and right parties, doesn’t thinks so. Teodoro Petkoff, once a guerrilla fighter, is now an ideologist working for the right wing opposition and the editor of the small newspaper Tal Cual. ‘I see no structural changes in the society. There has been a break with the old elite, but a new one has taken its place.’ 
On the left side, the criticism is even harder. Douglas Bravo, an ex-guerrilla fighter as well: ‘The actual power is still in the hands of the multinationals. Look at the petroleum sector: companies have been nationalized, but now the state is owner and exploiter.’ State capitalism, Bravo calls it, miles away from socialism, left alone communism. ‘This kind of left is a new kind of right, which we must fight’, the ex-fighter states. ‘Each modern revolution should originate from ecology. The planet’s future is on stake.’ And he adds: ‘On this very moment five members of the parliament and around thirty mayors are willing to create a new movement within the Chávism to start a revolution. With this new left wing movement we will defeat the two right parties.’

In the mean time, the ni ni camp –people who vote for opposition nor Chávez- is growing. Numerous problems stayed unresolved or even became worse over the past ten years. Corruption is flourishing more than ever and Venezuela is a leading country when it comes to the level of insecurity. In 2008, not less than 14,000 people were killed. And then there is the global economic crisis which will not leave Venezuela unharmed. The November local elections formally presented a victory for the officialism, which gained two thirds of the mayor seats and 17 out of 23 governor positions. But strategicly, the official regime lost some key positions, among which the function of mayor of the capital region of Caracas.

Still, most Venezuelans appear to consider Chávez irreplaceable, “for now”. On February 15th people went to vote in a referendum in order to reply to the question whether elected functionaries can candidate unlimitedly for the same post. In other words: whether Chávez can run again for president in 2012 or not. Chávez won the referendum and thus was granted in principle a next reigning period. He’ll have to be careful, however, because the people are awake and learned to care about their country’s future under Chávez. That is definitely one of the merits of the past decade’s regime.
But it’s common knowledge that Chavismo has no alternative leader with Chávez’ calibre. And the opposition has no leader who can compete with the president. A vast majority of the Venezuelans thinks, despite some justifiable criticism on his leadership, that Chávez is the only one to continue the emancipation process.  

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