How Israel’s Use of Militias in Gaza Revives a Colonial Formula of Divide and Rule

Netanyahu, ever deflective, accused Lieberman of political sabotage. Insisting that such leaks only help Hamas. ‘On the advice of security officials’, He said, ‘we activated clans in Gaza that oppose Hamas. What’s wrong with that?’

Who Are Those Militia?

Gaza’s militias are not ideological movements but loose networks of smugglers and fugitives. Their names are known in Gaza, not as political actors, but as predators.

The most notorious is Yasser Abu Shabab, a Rafah drug lord turned commander of the so-called Popular Forces. According to the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, his militia coordinates directly with the Israeli army. During the genocide, his men looted aid trucks in a “loot zone” just a few hundred meters from Israeli soldiers. And now, under the ceasefire, his mission evolved from looting to kidnapping, intimidation, and extortion.

Abu Shabab has posted on his social media videos flaunting Israeli-supplied equipment and an armored vehicle. Abu Shabab was reportedly assassinated on December 4th in what local sources described as ‘an internal dispute’, though his militia continues to operate despite his death.

In Khan Younis, Husam al-Astal leads another militia, accused of assassinating Palestinian scientist Fadi al-Batsh in Malaysia in 2018. He boasts of “constant communication” with COGAT, the Israeli military unit overseeing Gaza’s civilian affairs. In videos, he offers food and electricity, in exchange for loyalty, all under a “security check.”

When Hamas’s Arrow Unit launched an operation against his forces just a few days before the ceasefire, Israeli drones intervened and protected him; even the Israeli COGAT coordinator shared the video of the attack on his Facebook page.

Further north, Ashraf al-Mansi and his “People’s Army” operate openly in Beit Hanoun. Footage obtained by Sky News shows the IDF supplying the militia with water, food, and gasoline, among other things.

And in the east of Gaza City, Rami Heles leads the “AlShujaiya Popular Forces” in what used to be a vibrant neighborhood before the Israeli bombardment flattened it. Heles publicly claims independence, yet Israeli media have exposed his direct logistical ties to the army.

On the 20th of November, a new militia announced itself in the East Khan Younis, in southern Gaza. Led by Shawqi Abu Nassira, a former officer in the Palestinian Authority's security services.
Videos circulating on social media show Abu Nassira addressing a group of masked youths and vowing to fight Hamas.

Those five militias operate within the large part of Gaza that is now under direct Israeli control, an area marked with a yellow line on IDF maps.

According to the Israeli Public Broadcasting Corporation (Kan), Israeli ministers have called for shooting anyone near the “yellow line.” During a cabinet meeting, Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir asked, ‘Why don’t we shoot a child riding a donkey?’ Dudi Amsalem, the government’s liaison to the Knesset, cynically replied, ‘Who should be shot first, the child or the donkey?’

Militias outside the yellow zone (like the Doghmush clan, accused of kidnapping and killing journalist Saleh al-Jafrawi) received no protection. Two days after the ceasefire took effect, Hamas raided the clan in Al-Sabra neighborhood.

Trump approved the killings: ‘They did take out a couple of gangs that were very bad. Very, very bad gangs.’ Two days later, he threatened to ‘go in and kill Hamas’ if violence persisted. This shift in speech goes perfectly in tune with Israel’s strategy to groom militias and keep Gaza in perpetual ruin.

Reconstruction as Reward

That logic was made explicit by Trump's son-in-law, Jared Kushner, architect of the so-called “New Gaza initiative”, who proposed rebuilding only the areas under Israeli control. ‘As long as that can be secured’, he said, ‘we can start construction of a ‘New Gaza,’ a place where Palestinians can get jobs.’

Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz on October 18^th put it bluntly: Israel would occupy more than half of Gaza and keep ‘strict supervision of all crossings and the Philadelphi Corridor.’ In his words, this would prevent smuggling and ‘maintain IDF deployment along the yellow line.’ In practice, it means permanent oversight of food, aid, and freedom of movement.

Gaza, under such a plan, would remain divided: one half reconstructed under militia rule and Israeli supervision, the other half as a wasteland.

Israel’s Tracking Dogs

The people of Gaza, unsurprisingly, are not fooled. The families of Abu Shabab, al-Astal, al-Mansi, and Heles have all issued public statements disowning them, declaring that their relatives ‘do not represent their families or Palestine.’

Muath, a journalist still reporting from Gaza, said: ‘They are worse than traitors. They stole aid when we were starving. They are the occupier’s tracking dogs.’

Another resident, Muhammed, added: ‘There is no present nor future in Gaza, that’s what Israel tells us through these militias.’ Both men declined to give their full names for fear of the militias.

From Rafah to Gaza City, the message is clear: proxy rule shapes everyday survival, leaving civilians trapped between occupation and militia power.

Rule Through Militias, a Colonial Pattern

The playbook is old. It was drafted in Europe, tested in Africa, refined in the Middle East, and it survives every decolonization attempt like a stain that refuses to wash out.

In Africa, the colonial powers discovered early that it was often easier and cheaper to govern through proxies than to rule directly. In what became the Central African Republic, the French colonial state empowered local militia leaders, arming them and granting them authority to enforce order on its behalf.

When independence came, these structures didn’t vanish; local power networks persisted, and the colony lived on through its proxies. Israel is not imitating that history; it is continuing it.

Israel’s Own Militia Origins

The irony cuts even deeper when history tells us that Israel itself began as a militia. During the British Mandate in Palestine, the British authorities employed the Haganah (a Zionist paramilitary group founded in 1920) as a tool to suppress Palestinians who revolted against both colonial rule and mass Zionist immigration.

The British provided the Haganah with training in military tactics and counterinsurgency operations. Notably, British officer Orde Wingate, as the Times of Israel newspaper referred to him (the father of the Israeli Defence Forces). Wingate led the Special Night Squads, a joint British-Jewish force that conducted raids against Palestinian villages, employing methods such as preemptive strikes and collective punishment. Later, these operations became the blueprint for Israel’s military doctrine.

Out of the Haganah’s shadow, more radical groups emerged: Irgun and Lehi (the Stern Gang). The Irgun, led by future Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, turned against the British themselves, targeting soldiers and civilians alike in pursuit of the new state of Israel.

According to a UK Parliament debate record from November 9, 1944, two members of the Stern Group assassinated Lord Moyne, Britain’s Minister for the Middle East.

And, as documented by the British National Army Museum, on July 22, 1946, Irgun bombed the King David Hotel, killing more than ninety people.

By 1948, Lehi assassinated Count Folke Bernadotte, the UN mediator and head of the Swedish Red Cross. As detailed in the Al Jazeera documentary, “Killing the Count”. Bernadotte had helped rescue 30000 from Nazi camps. In an extraordinary humanitarian effort which would come to be known as the ‘white Buses campaign’.

The British colonial hand that had once fed Zionist militias found itself bitten and driven out; yet the militias stayed. Their names changed, but their methods did not. As shown in the Middle East Eye documentary, the Haganah, Irgun, and Lehi were absorbed into the newborn IDF. Inheriting not only their weapons but also their worldview: control through fragmentation, order through domination.

Lebanon as a Rehearsal 

Before Gaza, Israel applied the proxy strategy beyond its borders in Lebanon. In the late 1970s, the Israeli army helped form and arm the South Lebanon Army (SLA), a Christian militia tasked with fighting the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Lebanese resistance groups.

The SLA manned checkpoints, ran prisons, and even declared its own microstate “Free Lebanon” in 1979. No one recognized it except its patron: Israel. When Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982 and besieged Beirut, the SLA acted as its local enforcer, in a role that reached its darkest moment in the Sabra and Shatila massacre, where roughly 3,500 Palestinians were killed in two refugee camps.

A declassified CIA document later confirmed that the SLA’s existence depended entirely on Israeli logistical, intelligence, and financial support. When Israel finally withdrew from Lebanon in 2000, the militia collapsed overnight. Its leader, Antoine Lahad, fled to Israel, then to Paris, dying in exile fifteen years later.

From the British Mandate to Lebanon and now Gaza, the script of Divide and Rule has barely changed. And the tragedy is not that the story repeats; it is that the world continues to watch as if seeing it for the first time.