Who still wants to be in league with the Palestinian Authority?

Analyse

The weak position of the Palestinian administration

Who still wants to be in league with the Palestinian Authority?

Manifestatie in Berlijn ter herdenking van de Palestijnse Nakba.
Manifestatie in Berlijn ter herdenking van de Palestijnse Nakba.

The Palestinian Authority, the official governing body of the Palestinian territories, is not having it under wraps. Its own people see it as weak and corrupt, and Israel threatens a second Gaza in the West Bank. Europe, the Arab League and the US want a strongly reformed Palestinian Authority, but what it should look like remains vague.

This article was translated from Dutch by kompreno, which provides high-quality, distraction-free journalism in five languages. Partner of the European Press Prize, kompreno curates top stories from 30+ sources across 15 European countries. Join here to support independent journalism.

On 25 March, even before the fragile new ceasefire in Gaza, people in northern Gaza took to the streets. ‘Largest street protests against Hamas since October 2023’, headlines included BBC, The Guardian and The New York Times. The difference with Arab-oriented media, such as Middle East Eye and Al Jazeera, was striking. There it sounded that the protests were primarily against the war and the Israeli army, not Hamas.

The news site Al-Monitor quoted a university student who did speak of anti-Hamas sentiments, but also pointed an accusing finger at the Palestinian Authority (PA). The latter is said to have instigated the protests, it sounds.

Palestinian Authority?

The Palestinian Authority (PA) has been the official governing body of the Palestinian territories since 1994. It is headed by Prime Minister Mohammed Mustafa and controlled by the Fatah party of President Mahmoud Abbas. The mandate of current president Mahmoud Abbas officially ended in 2009 but Abbas continued to extend his own term.

The PA was established in 1994 under the Oslo Accords, which said it would have a temporary mandate to install a functioning Palestinian state by 1999.

But de facto Hamas has been governing Gaza since 2007, following a clash with Fatah, the main party behind the PA. So today, the PA's governance is limited to the West Bank.

It is also bound by the division of the area into three administrative zones, A, B and C, also laid down in the Oslo Accords as a temporary measure. Zone A is under full control of the PA. Zone B is under the control of the PA for daily administration and of Israel for military control. Zone C is under full Israeli control. By the way, even that envisaged timeframe has since been greatly exceeded.

Many Palestinians see the PA as a Western-controlled government. This idea does not come out of the blue. Everyone seems to want to have their say on the PA.

On 4 March, high-ranking figures from Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and others met in Cairo to unveil an Arab plan. That plan envisages a transition and future scenario for Gaza and offers a response to Trump's deportation proposal for Palestinians from Gaza. The plan builds on previous extensive consultations and discussions with the PA and gives it an important role. But, it sounded, the PA must reform.

Europe also supports the PA for now as the only possible administrator of a Palestinian state, but for the first time attaches conditions to that support.

PA popularity at low point

After the devastating war Israel launched in Gaza after 7 October 2023, Hamas' popularity soared. Also in the West Bank where the PA governs. According to the latest opinion poll by the Palestinian research centre PCPSR, dated September 2024, Hamas' popularity fell slightly (to 36%). Fatah, the Palestinian president's party, remains stuck at 21%.

The PA itself saw its popularity shrink over the years. This is partly due to its 89-year-old president, Mahmoud Abbas, who has long passed his own expiry date. As many as 84% of Palestinians want Abbas gone, according to the PCPSR's poll.

Quite a few Palestinians see the PA primarily as far too weak a leadership in the face of an increasingly aggressive Israeli occupation, with growing settler violence, settlement expansion and land confiscation. The PA is seen by many as corrupt, ineffective, acting on behalf of Israel and more concerned about its own survival than Palestinian national interests.

Israel began heavy raids on the West Bank as early as 2023, including in the Jenin and Tulkarm refugee camps. And in 2025, the Israeli Army launched the Iron Wall military operation against armed Palestinian resistance in the refugee camps there.

Many homes and infrastructure have already been destroyed in that violent operation. As many as 40,000 Palestinians in the West Bank lost their homes and even total access to the refugee camps, according to the non-profit think tank International Crisis Group. Palestinian security forces also conducted military operations against armed groups in Jenin and Tubas, and the PA is also blamed for this.

What is the PA's dilemma?

Today, the PA faces a dilemma, writes Tahani Mustafa of the International Crisis Group in a recent commentary. ‘The situation in the West Bank today makes concrete the older dilemma of the Palestinian national movement’, Mustafa writes. And that dilemma is: ‘cooperating with Israel at any cost (...) versus actively opposing the occupation, through popular protests or through armed confrontation.’

If the PA goes along with the Israeli security narrative by fighting Palestinian armed groups, it loses legitimacy with its own people. If the PA goes along with the armed resistance, it calls down a potential Gaza scenario on the West Bank.

Given the threat of the Gaza scenario, the PA is inclined to take the prevention stance, believes Martin Konecny of the European Middle East Project. ‘The PA absolutely wants to avoid Israel finding a pretext to unfold that scenario. This is countered by the counter-argument: “Israel is going to unfold that plan anyway, so this caution will get you nowhere, you're just postponing the execution and at the same time you're not mobilising resistance”.’

So today, the PA seems to be between hammer and anvil. Because there is also increasing pressure from outside. Calls for reforms are loud and relations with Israel are increasingly hostile.

Which PA does the Arab world want?

It is unclear what form of Palestinian Authority the Arab states want to engage with, says Martin Konecny. 'The United Arab Emirates also want President Abbas out. They are fans of Mohammed Dahlan, who currently resides in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and who is not best friends with Abbas.'

Dahlan, a key former top Gaza defence expert within the PA, would certainly influence the Emirates' critical attitude towards the current Palestinian Authority. Remarkably, Konecny says, Abbas recently announced amnesty for all those he kicked out of Fatah. That is a concession to Dahlan and the UAE.

But for the UAE, the cult of persons is less important than its geopolitical and strategic agenda, which will determine what the PA should look like. 'The UAE's agenda serves their relationship with Israel, but mostly with the US,' says Konecny. 'Those US ties are a thousand times more important than the interests of the Palestinians.'

Which PA does the European Union want?

‘At the European Union, we see a growing attitude to make the Palestinian Authority fit into a European scenario’, says EU MP Marc Botenga, who sits on the foreign affairs committee for the PVDA-PTB. ‘We already saw this in the formation of the new PA cabinet last year, following the resignation of the existing cabinet (in February 2024, the full government of Prime Minister Mohammed Shtayyeh resigned, ed.). The EU was all too keen to have a say in that.’

‘Some of the reforms proposed by the EU are clearly based more on Israeli demands than on what is needed to make the PA more efficient and legitimate.’

‘And we see how the EU is now attaching conditions to the new financial aid to the Palestinians.’ Last summer, the European Commission promised a new package of emergency aid to the PA, along with an agreement in principle on a rehabilitation programme for the Palestinians. In the letter of intent, the EU and the PA noted that ‘fiscal stabilisation requires substantial reforms of the Palestinian Authority’.

In this, Martin Konecny is particularly concerned about the growth of pro-Israel voices in Europe. ‘The PA was repeatedly asked by the European Union and the United States to reform. Some of those reforms are clearly based more on Israeli demands than on what is needed to make the PA more efficient and legitimate in the eyes of its own people.’

Konecny also points to the fact that no conditions are imposed on Israel in the Horizon Europe research and cooperation programme. ‘So Israel enjoys enormous support there, without having conditions imposed on it.’

Mohammad Mustafa (premier en minister van Buitenlandse Zaken van de Palestijnse Autoriteit) en Kaja Kallas (Hoge Vertegenwoordiger van de Europese Unie voor Buitenlandse Zaken en Veiligheidsbeleid), bij een ontmoeting in Brussel op 17 januari 2025.

Mohammad Mustafa (Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Palestinian Authority) and Kaja Kallas (High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy), during a meeting in Brussels on January 17, 2025.

What conditions are we talking about?

The letter of intent between the European Union and the PA included a list of conditions to be implemented already by the end of August 2024. These include 5% cuts in fixed government spending and mandatory retirement ages for civil servants. ‘Those are pretty trivial issues’, says Botenga.

But, he says, a few other conditions did raise questions.

For instance, one of the conditions refers to an education reform ‘including modernisation of the curriculum’. This is about the EU's obsession with contested content in Palestinian textbooks, says Martin Konecny.

‘It concerns passages in textbooks that are seen as controversial because they would call for hostility towards Israel. Under pressure from MEPs with strong ties to Israel, the narrative about alleged anti-Semitism in Palestinian textbooks has become a one-sided and disproportionate one.’

Another condition concerns payments by the Palestinian government to families of Palestinians captured or killed by Israeli forces. Those payments have long been a thorn in the side of Israel and the US, which refer to the practice as “pay for slay”: rewarding perpetrators of violence against Israel.

‘They have twisted the arm of the Palestinian Authority in those negotiations’, Botenga says. ‘At a hearing in the European Parliament, I asked Gert Jan Koopman, then director-general of Enlargement and Neighbourhood, whether other things were imposed that were not in the final agreement. His answer was that the Commission relied on the Palestinian Authority's proposal. ”That is nonsense.”’

Are the conditions being met?

Yes, says Martin Konecny, the PA was already fulfilling some of the conditions. For instance, Abbas already issued en decree ending the existing benefit system for prisoners. ‘This is remarkable because the PA implemented those reforms even before the Commission clarified the full financial package. It is still vague exactly how much money is involved, as there is nothing on paper about a second phase.’

In a first phase, the EU provides short-term emergency aid to cover urgent financial needs: €400 million. A second phase involves a comprehensive multi-year programme ‘for Palestinian recovery and resilience’. So that phase remains out for now, as does the continuation of the promised financial support.

MEPs, including Marc Botenga, sounded out the reasons for the delays via a written question to the Commission. ‘The responsible Directorate-General of the Commission (Enlargement and Eastern Neighbourhood, ed.) says the last part of the emergency aid was deposited on 18 November 2024’, Botenga said.

In its response, the Commission revealed that ‘hard work is being done on the second phase’, referring to a European-Palestinian agreement on 31 October 2024. That would deal with Palestinian reforms to form the basis of the multi-year programme.

Will Palestinian reforms include elections?

It has been 2006 since Palestinians went to the polls. However, elections were scheduled for 2021, partly to elect a new president. But Abbas then abruptly cancelled the ballot.

Four years later, national elections in the Occupied Palestinian Territories and destroyed Gaza are even less evident. There is not only the military violence, but also the rift between Hamas and Fatah, Abbas's party, which makes national elections a difficult task. Moreover, Israel does not see elections in East Jerusalem, a prerequisite for national elections, as an option.

Arab countries did emphasise a Palestinian unity government and national Palestinian elections in their communications on 4 March. But there is, remarkably, nothing about this in the final Arab Plan.

The timing is difficult, commentators say about this. For now, Europe is also a cool lover of elections. Marc Botenga also says so: ‘The European Union has abandoned the idea of elections altogether, for fear that in snap elections Hamas will win. It mainly illustrates how the Palestinian Authority is governed too much from outside. Everyone is trying to find a solution from outside, which the PA may or may not have to agree to.’

Does the PA have a choice?

‘You always have a choice’, Marc Botenga believes. ‘Anyway, part of the Palestinian population is not happy with the PA, but that applies to Palestinian political parties in general. However, it is up to the PA and the Palestinians themselves to make the choice, not others, not Europe and not Arab countries.’

‘The Arab Plan may provide for a place for the PA, and not Hamas, in Gaza. But who that PA should be is unclear. Is today's PA also tomorrow's PA?’

The PA has little choice, thinks Martin Konecny of European Middle East Project. ‘It is that recurring dilemma. It adjusts for financial support and security today, but at the same time it weakens its credibility with its own citizens and plays into Hamas' hands. Hamas can say, “We release prisoners in exchange for Israeli hostages, while the PA cuts benefits for the same prisoners with those reforms.” So who is serving the national interest?’


This article was translated from Dutch by kompreno, which provides high-quality, distraction-free journalism in five languages. Partner of the European Press Prize, kompreno curates top stories from 30+ sources across 15 European countries. Join here to support independent journalism.

The translation process is assisted by AI. The original article remains the definitive version. While we strive for top accuracy, some nuances of the original text may not be fully captured.